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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Action was brought in the lower court by the 
Plaintiff as holder in due course; and without 
recourse, of a Promissory Note and Contract 
signed by the Defendants and Appellants and 
made payable to the third party Defendants and 
Respondent. , in the amount and according to 
their terms. 
Appellants admitted liability upon the note 
and contract, but alleged that Respondent had 
agreed to pay the obligation or at least to hold 
the Defendants harmless upon the obligation. 
The Respondents defended upon the ground that 
the document wherein the third party Defendants 
had agreed to save Appellants harmless was ob-
tained by fraud. 
Testimony was presented by the Appellants, 
solely for the purpose of negating the allegations 
of fraud. No finding of fraud was made by Trial 
Court. 
The Lower Court dismissed the third party 
complaint upon the grounds that the Respondent 
did not understand the meaning of the word 
"obligation", as used in the instrument signed 
by Appellant and Respondent. 
It is from the Court's judgment dismissing 
the third party complaint that Appellants now 
appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The court erred in ruling that a person 
taking part in a bilateral contract is entitled to 
enforce his individual standard of meaning to the 
contract. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court erred in ruling that a 
person taking part in a bilateral contract is en-
titled to enforce his individual standards of 
meaning to the contract. 
When a person takes part in a bilateral act, 
for example, a transaction in which other per-
sons share, he must accept a common standard. 
He cannot claim to enforce his individual stand-
ard of meaning. Quoted from Wigmore on 
Evidence, Volume 9, Page 216-217, Paragraph 
2466. 
12, Amer. Juris. Title: Contracts, page 
751, Paragraph 229, Necessity of Interpretation: 
Plain Language. "Words are to receive their 
plain and literal meaning even though the in-
tention of the party drawing the contract may 
! l~o. 
l room 
,ilie .. , 
, ]' ., . 
, o··. 
have been different from that expressed. It is jtte;: 
said that the agreement of the parties is to be 
ascertained by the plain language used by them, 
no matter what the intentions rna y have been. 
Presumptively, the intent of the parties to a 
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contract is expressed by the natural and ordinary 
meaning of their language referrable to it, and 
such meaning cannot be perverted or destroyed by 
the Courts through construction" 0 
This is an elementary and universal rule, and 
it would appear redundant to cite cases to support 
it. However, the following cases from our own 
jurisdiction are cited for this purpose o 
"Intent of parties to clear an unambiguous con-
tract must be determined from the language thereof" o 
Middleton-vs-Evans, 45 Pac. 2do 570-86 Utah, 
396. 
"Where a writing is clear and plain on its 
face and not ambiguous or doubtful, there is no 
room for construction, but resort must be had to 
the language employed in determining the mean-
ing or intention of the writing". Richlands Irri-
gation Company, -vs -Westview Irrigation Company, 
80 Pac. 2d. 458, 96 Utah 403. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the lower courts 
order dismissing the third party complaint 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID H. BYBEE 
Attorney for Appellants 
• 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE CONTINENTAL BANK 
AND TRUST COMPANY, a 
Utah banking corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID H. BYBEE and VERDA 
M. BYBEE, Case No. 8500 
Defendants and Appellants, 
vs. 
W. H. ADAMS CARPET 
COMPANY, 
Third Party Defendants 
and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It is submitted that the inadequacy of appel-
lant's statement of facts makes a restatement neces-
sary. 
Respondent operates a carpet business. In 
February of 1955, it entered into an agreement 
with appellants to sell and install in their home 
carpeting of a certain designated type. The agreed 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
purchase price was $607.00. Appellant paid $177.00 
in cash and for the balance of $430.00 signed a 
promissory note with respondent as payee, which 
note included interest. Respondent discounted this 
note to The Continental Bank and Trust Com-
pany and the parties stipulated that the Bank took 
the note as a holder in due course. Appellants knew 
of this transfer and made one payment to the bank 
of $7 4.86 ( R. p. 55), leaving a balance unpaid on the 
note of $37 4.30. 
Subsequently, appellant became dissatisfied 
with the carpeting which was installed. They 
claimed that it had an unsightly seam along one wall 
and that they had ordered wall to wall carpeting 
without seams. Several visits were made to appel-
lant's home by agents of the respondent, in an at-
tempt to adjust the matter. These negotiations in-
cluded, according to the testimony of respondent's 
manager, the sending to appellant's home of a crew 
of men who reburied the carpet (R. p. 38) and 
later an offer to take back the carpet and refund 
appellant's money. (R. p. 43) Finally, the parties 
thought they had reached a settlement. On May 18, 
1955, respondent's agent, Thompson, took over to 
appellant David H. Bybee the check for $100.00. 
It was Thompson's testimony that he understood 
the agreement of settlement to be that respondent 
was to pay appellant $100.00 which would be a full 
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adjustment of the defect in the carpet and that ap-
pellant would keep the carpet and pay off the out-
standing promissory note to the Bank. ( R. p. 44 ; 
p. 54) 
Appellant David H. Bybee is a practicing At-
torney. When Thompson came to his office with the 
check Bybee told him he had drawn up a paper 
which set forth their understanding and asked 
Thompson to sign. Thompson testified that he 
glanced over it, signed and handed Bybee the check. 
( R. p. 45) The agreement reads as follows: 
"Agreement" 
"THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into 
by and between W. H. ADAMS & SONS of 
Salt Lake County, Utah, and DAVID H. BY-
BEE of Davis County, Utah. 
"WITNESSETH: 
"THAT WHEREAS, DAVID H. BYBEE 
has heretofore purchased a carpet from W. H. 
ADAMS & SONS which carpet has hereto-
fore been installed and placed in the living 
room of the home of Mr. and Mrs. David H. 
Bybee at 6885 Orchard Drive, Bountiful, 
Utah, and a contract for the payment of the 
unpaid purchase price has been entered into; 
"AND WHEREAS, he is dissatisfied with 
said carpet. 
"AND WHEREAS, W. H. ADAMS & SONS 
are desirous of making an amicable settle-
ment: IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED: 
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1. That W. H. ADAMS & SONS will 
pay to DAVID H. BYBEE the sum 
of One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars. 
2. Will give DAVID H. BYBEE a Bill 
of Sale for the carpet showing com-
plete payment and vesting the title 
of the property in DAVID H. BY-
BEE. 
3. Will cancel any and all evidences of 
any indebtedness by DAVID H. BY-
BEE to the W. H. ADAMS & SONS, 
their assignees, or transferees, or 
agents. 
4. DAVID H. BYBEE will give and 
does by these presents give to W. H. 
ADAMS & SONS a complete release 
from any and all liability, damages, 
actions or any claim that he may 
have against W. H. ADAMS & SONS 
by reason of having purchased the 
aforesaid carpet. 
DATED May 18, 1955. 
W. H. ADAMS & SONS 
By /s/ C. M. Thompson 
/s/ David H. Bybee 
DAVID H. BYBEE" 
Thompson had written on the back of the check he 
handed Bybee the following: 
"In full settlement on adjustment on carpet in-
stalled in the Bybee residence." 
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Later, Bybee refused to make payment to the 
Bank and the Bank commenced action on the promis-
sory note. Appellant filed a general denial in that 
action and filed a third party complaint against 
respondent alleging the execution of an agreement 
"that third party defendant would assume and pay 
the obligation to The Continental Bank and Trust 
Company herein sued upon and would hold the de-
fendant harmless from any action by any person 
based upon the said promissory note." (R. p. 3) The 
Bybees alleged that respondent maliciously refused 
to make payment as agreed and claimed relief from 
the bank's claim, for attorney's fees and for puni-
tive damages. 
Judgment vvas given the Bank against the By-
bees which judgment has been satisfied. After testi-
money, the trial court found that there was no pro-
vision in the written agreement, (Ex. 3) or was 
there any agreement which provided that the carpet 
company would assume the promissory note then 
held by the bank or that the carpet company would 
hold the Bybees harmless from any damages based 
on this note. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. THE AGREEMENT OF MAY 18, 1955 
IS NOT CLEAR, PLAIN AND UNAMBIGUOUS. 
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TION OF THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES WAS 
REASONABLE. 
(a) It is not the only writing. 
(b) The respondent's interpretation leads to 
an unreasonable result. 
(c) Appellant did not request return of the 
promissory note. 
(d) Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the agreement of 
May 18 are merely mutual releases. 
(e) Findings of fact of the trial court shall 
be set aside only if clearly against the 
weight of the evidence. 
(f) The absence of an express finding as to 
fraud does not prejudice appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE AGREEMENT OF MAY 18, 1955 
IS NOT CLEAR, PLAIN AND UNAMBIGUOUS. 
The Bybees contend that in signing the agree-
ment of May 18, 1955, Adams Carpet Company 
agreed not only to let them keep the carpet, but to 
pay the Bybees $100.00 and to relieve them of their 
obligation on the promissory note. In other words, 
the Bybees contend that Adams Carpet company 
agreed that because of a seam along the wall, that 
they would reduce a $607.00 sale to $77.00. 
Appellants, in their laconic brief, rely upon the 
rule that a court must resort to the language of the 
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instrument alone in determining the meaning of the 
parties. Of course, as this court has held, this rule 
applies only "where a writing is clear and plain on 
its face and not ambiguous or doubtful." Richards 
Irr. Co. vs. Westview Co. (1938) 96 Utah, 403, 80 
P. 2d, 458. The instant case does not contain facts 
which bring it within this rule. 
To begin with, the agreement drafted by Bybee 
was not the only writing executed on that date by 
the parties. Bybee endorsed the $100.00 check, which 
contained an unconditional release above his sig-
nature. There was no reference there to the asump-
tion of a debt to a third party. This writing is 
completely consistent with the carpet company's in-
terpretation of their agreement. Even if another 
writing conflicted with this one, would there be any 
reason why the agreement set forth on the check is 
not just as effective? In that event, we would have 
conflicting documents and the court would have to 
look to the underlying facts to determine the true 
agreements of the parties. 
But it is submitted that the recitation on the 
check and the more elaborate agreement drafted by 
Bybee are not inconsistent. Neither contains an 
agreement to assume a promissory note. The Bybees 
contend that the carpet company agreed with them 
in writing that the carpet company would "assume 
and pay the obligation to The Continental Bank and 
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Trust Company herein sued upon and would hold the 
defendant harmless from any action from any per-
son, based upon the said promissory note." ( 3rd 
Party complaint, R. p. 3.) 
The only part of the agreement drafted by By-
bee, which might conceivably refer to the agree-
ment alleged in the Bybees' complaint is paragraph 
3, which provides : 
"It is mutually agreed: * * * 
3. Will cancel any and all evidences of any in-
debtedness by David H. Bybee to the W. H. 
Adams and Sons, their assigns, or trans-
ferees or agents." 
The ambiguity of paragraph 3 is most clearly 
shown by the fact that the Bybees, in attempting to 
re-state what they claim the paragraph to mean, 
had to use completely different and more concise 
language (we refer to Mr. Bybee's letter of June 
8, 1955, ex. 7, and paragraph II of the Third party 
complaint (R. p. 3)). These show that Bybee could 
clearly say what he meant when he wanted to do so. 
The trial court found that this sentence did 
not refer to the promissory note held by The Con-
tinental Bank (R. p. 59-60). A word-by-word 
analysis shows the propriety of this decision. 
The Bybee-drafted instrument provides that the 
parties will "cancel any and all evidence of any in-
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debtedness." The word "cancel" means to physically 
annul or destroy. The word has been so interpreted 
by several courts, including this one. Thus, in Clegg 
v. Schvaneveldt, ( 1932), 79 Utah 195 8 P. 2d 620, 
621 this court said: 
"The word 'cancel' means to make void 
or invalid. It is synonomous with annul, 
abolish, reject, abrogate, repeal, make void, 
do away with, etc." 
A New York court has held that there can be 
no such thing as a "cancellation" of an instrument 
either as a physical fact or as a legal inference 
unless the instrument itself is in some form defaced 
or obliterated. In Re Akers Will (1902), 77 N.Y. 
Supp. 643, 646. The Supreme Court of Michigan has 
held that to determine whether a note is cancelled 
within the meaning of the Uniform Negotiable In-
struments law, the court shall look to the act of de-
struction of the instrument, and not the intent of 
the parties to make a gift or release. McDonald v. 
Loomis, ( 1925), 233 Mich. 17 4, 206 N. W. 348. 
To "cancel" implies therefor, a thing within the 
control of the person cancelling. 
One cannot physically deal with something he 
does not have in his posession or control. The promis-
sory note was held by the Continental Bank. The 
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Even more clearly, the word "cancel" does not 
imply the taking of affirmative action to hold the 
Bybees harmless from subsequent litigation. 
"Evidence of indebtedness" is a legal term of 
art meant to cover all sorts of obligations. There was 
no need of such "legalese" in this case. There was 
only one obligation outstanding-the promissory 
note held by The Con tin en tal Bank. If the drafter 
meant to refer to this, he should have said so. In 
the light of the circumstances, it is not unreason-
able to assume a desire on the part of the drafter 
to obfuscate or to make less obvious. 
Particularly in light of the general rule in-
terpreting a con tract against the person who drew 
it, there can be little question but that the writings 
of the parties were not clear and unambiguous. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETA-
TION OF THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES WAS 
REASONABLE. 
Where the wording of a contract is not clear 
and unambiguous, the trial court may look at all 
the facts and circumstances to determine the intent 
of the parties. 
(a) It is not the only writing . 
... 
As pointed out above, the agreement drafted by 
Bybee, is of course, not the only writing involved in 
10 
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this case. Bybee endorsed the $100.00 check which 
contained a clause a clear release with no provision 
for any assumption of any indebtedness to a third 
party. The recitation above Bybee's endorsement is 
cons is tent with the trial court's interpretation of 
the parties of May 18, 1955. To accept the Bybee 
interpretation would mean to ignore this recitation. 
(b) The respondent's interpretation leads to 
an unreasonable result. 
To assume that the carpet company, because of 
a minor flaw in installation would all but give the 
carpet away, is to assume the ridiculous. The By-
bees claim breach of warranty. Their possible 
remedies under the law are to seek either ( 1) di-
minution in price, (2) damages, if consequential, 
or ( 3) rescission, by returning the article. (Sec. 
60-5-7 UCA '53) 
There is no evidence of consequential damage. 
Appellant did not seek to rescind. To assume that a 
carpet company would concede that a $607.00 car-
pet job has been reduced in value to $77.00 because 
of a seam which showed, is to put little faith in the 
perennial optimism of the American salesman. 
(c) Appellant did not request return of the 
promissory note. 
Mr. Bybee is a lawyer who knows that the most 
effective way to provide for payment of a promis-
11 
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sory note by Adams, would have been simply tore-
quire Adams to deliver the original note to him. 
Not only was no such provision made, but the agree-
ment makes no reference at all to the disposition of 
the promissory note. 
(d) Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the agreement of 
May 18, -are merely mutual releases. 
Respondent's manager Thompson was a lay-
man. He hurriedly read through the proposed agree-
ment. A cursory examination of paragraphs 3 and 4 
would lead one untrained in verbal subtlety to as-
sume that it was merely a mutual release of rights 
by both parties against each other. That Thompson 
understood it to be so is shown by his testimony and 
the writing on his check. Also, it is the most obvious 
interpretation to be given. 
(e) Findings of fact of the Trial Court shall 
be set aside only if clearly against the 
weight of the evidence. 
The trial court heard all of the testimony and 
observed the witnesses and parties. On the basis of 
all of the evidence, the court ruled as to the intent 
of the parties and the meaning of their agreements. 
Even if another court may have decided otherwise 
on the same evidence, there is sufficient evidence 
in the record to support the trial court's finding. 
As the record clearly can support such a finding, it 
12 
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cannot be set aside on appeal. Perry v. M cConkie, 
(1953) 1 Utah 2d 189, 264 P. 2d 852; Morley v. 
Willden, et al., (1951, 120 Utah 423, 235 P. 2d 500. 
(f) The absence of an express finding as to 
fraud does not prejudice appellant. 
Appellant mentions that the trial court made 
no finding as to fraud. The carpet company, in ad-
dition to denying that there was an agreement be-
tween the parties as alleged by appellant, also al-
leged affirmatively that if there were such a writing, 
it was procured and signed as a result of fraud 
and mistake. The absence of such a finding by the 
trial court is an assumed denial of such a fact, and 
as it clearly does not prejudice appellant, has no 
bearing on this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the several writings of the 
parties made on May 18, 1955, are by no means clear 
and unambiguous on their face. In the light of all 
the facts, the finding of the trial court as to the in-
tent of the parties is reasonable. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT & MABEY 
ALBERT J. COLTON 
Attorneys for Respondent 
W. H. Adams Carpet Company 
13 
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